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WHO'S SUING WHO? A COMMENTARY ON INVESTMENT
BANKERS AND THE MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY
MANNING GILBERT WARREN III*
I. INTRODUCTION
Industrial espionage appears to have permeated the investment
banking industry. Recent enforcement efforts by the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC)' and resulting criminal convictions2
have revealed publicly that the problem is not isolated or episodic
but is endemic.' The evil uncovered goes far beyond the classic in-
sider trading context, in which a corporate insider uses nonpublic
positive or negative financial news about a company, "inside infor-
mation,"4 to make trading profits in that company's securities. The
* Professor of Law, University of Alabama School of Law. B.A., University of Ala-
bama, 1970;J.D., George Washington University, 1973. The author gratefully acknowl-
edges the research assistance of Catherine K. Anderson and Sherri L. Tucker in the
preparation of this article.
1. See, e.g., SEC v. Siegel, No. 87 Civ. 0963, 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 247
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 1987); SEC v. Cecola, No. 86 Civ. 9735, slip op. (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22,
1986); SEC v. Pomerantz, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
93,008 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 1986); SEC v. Boesky, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 92,991 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 1986); SEC v. Wilkis, 18 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep.
(BNA) 962 (S.D.N.Y. July 1, 1986); SEC v. Sokolow, 18 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 962
(S.D.N.Y. July 1, 1986); SEC v. Levine, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 92,761 (S.D.N.Y. June 5, 1986); SEC v. Tome, 638 F. Supp. 596 (S.D.N.Y.
1986); SEC v. Thayer, 17 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 841 (N.D. Tex. May 7, 1985); SEC
v. Musella, 578 F. Supp. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
2. See, e.g., United States v. Siegel, 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 247 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 13, 1987); United States v. Cecola, 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 219 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 10, 1987); United States v. Wilkis, No. 86 Cr. 1112, 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA)
219 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 1987); United States v. David, 18 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 794
(S.D.N.Y. June 5, 1986); United States v. Thayer, 17 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 841
(D.D.C. May 8, 1985). See generally Stewart & Hertzberg, Street Bombshell: Inside-Trading
Scandal Implicates High Aides at Goldman, Kidder, Wall St. J., Feb. 13, 1987, at 1, col. 6;
Arrests Stun Employees at Kidder Peabody, Goldman and Come at a Crucial Juncture for Both Bro-
kerages, Wall St.J., Feb. 13, 1987, at 10, col. 1.
3. Miller & Cohen, 'I Am Not A Crook' Image Problem Dogs Investment Bankers, Wall St.
J., Mar. 9, 1987, at 1, col. 4; Stewart & Hertzberg, Broker's Role: Deals in Boesky Probe Show
Increasing Links with Drexel Burnham, Wall St. J., Dec. 5, 1986, at 1, col. 6; Anders, Boesky
Insider-Trading Case May Hurt Confidence in Markets, Spur Regulation, Wall St. J., Nov. 17,
1986, at 29, col. 1.
4. Generally, the term "inside information" refers to "information which comes
from within the corporation or affects the price of corporate stock because of its reflec-
tion of a corporation's expected earnings or assets." Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and In-
formational Advantages Under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REv. 322, 329 (1979).
See also Karmel, Market Information: Insider Trading, 195 N.Y.LJ. 1 (June 19, 1986) (stating
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expanded context involves outsiders, investment bankers, and their
that inside information refers to events or circumstances known to corporate manage-
ment which may be expected to change materially the market price of the company
stock). Under rule lOb-5, a federal cause of action arises for the misuse of material
nonpublic information by a corporate insider for personal gain. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848-49 (2d Cir. 1968) (citing In re Cady Roberts & Co.,
40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961)), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
A variation of the classical insider trading case occurs when the corporate insider
gives material, nonpublic information to an outsider and the "tippee" then trades with-
out disclosing the information. The Supreme Court addressed this situation in Dirks v.
SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983). Secrist, an officer of Equity Funding of America, informed
Dirks, an investment analyst, that Equity Funding's assets were fraudulently overstated.
Id. at 649. Dirks investigated the matter and passed the information on to his clients who
sold their holdings in Equity Funding. Id. The SEC censured Dirks for violation of rule
10b-5. Id. at 650-52. Referring to its decision in Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222
(1980), the Supreme Court noted that the duty to disclose or abstain from trading arises
from a fiduciary relationship, not from the mere possession of material, nonpublic infor-
mation. 463 U.S. at 657. The Court reasoned that a "tippee" must assume the insider's
fiduciary duty to shareholders when the insider's disclosure is deemed improper. Id. at
660. The Court ruled that an insider's disclosure is improper "when the insider has
breached his fiduciary duty to the shareholders by disclosing the information to the tip-
pee and the tippee knows or should know that there has been a breach." Id. Concluding
that Secrist properly disclosed the information, the Supreme Court held that Dirks had
no duty to abstain from the use of the information. Id. at 667. See Comment, Inside
Information and Outside Traders: Corporate Recovery of the Outsider's Unfair Gain, 73 CALIF. L.
REV. 483, 498-99 (1985) (arguing that the constructive insider concept extends rule lOb-
5 liability only to a limited group of outsiders).
In the Dirks opinion, the Supreme Court commented that one who legitimately re-
ceives confidential information from the corporation may become a "constructive in-
sider" and, therefore, owe a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of the disclosing
corporation. 463 U.S. at 655 n.14. The court stated that the duty is based not only
upon the receipt of the information but also upon the "special confidential relationship"
entered into to conduct corporate business. While the "constructive insider" rule may
extend the reach of rule lOb-5 beyond corporate officers, it fails to operate in the
Chiarella context in which the outsiders were trading on material, nonpublic information.
Chiarella's duty to the shareholders of the acquiring corporation was not breached when
he engaged in securities transactions with the shareholders of the target corporation. See
infra notes 54-65 and accompanying text.
Several state courts have addressed the issue whether an insider trading on nonpub-
lic inside information is liable in a shareholders derivative action for breach of common-
law fiduciary duties to the corporation. In Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248
N.E.2d 910, 912, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78, 81 (1969), the New York Court of Appeals held that,
under common-law agency principles, a corporate insider was liable to the corporation
for trading on material, nonpublic information. See also In re ORFA Sec. Litig., No. 86-
1121, slip op. (D.NJ. Feb. 10, 1987) (available on LEXIS, Fedsec library, Courts file)
(holding that New Jersey law provides a derivative cause of action against a corporate
officer who sells his corporation's stock on the basis of inside information); Brophy v.
Cities Services Co., 31 Del. Ch. 241, 70 A.2d 5 (1949) (holding that Delaware law pro-
vides a cause of action against an employee for purchases of stock in advance of the
corporation's stock repurchase program). But see Freeman v. Decio, 584 F.2d 186, 192
(7th Cir. 1978) (holding that Indiana law does not provide a derivative cause of action
for an insider's activities because the corporation has not been injured); Schein v.
Chasen, 478 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated sub nom. Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S.
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employees, who in breach of their client's confidences sell, ex-
change, and reap trading profits on nonpublic, "outside informa-
tion"5 relating to the marketplace initiatives of their clients.
Most of the public attention regarding this conduct has focused
upon the SEC's enforcement proceedings, which have produced un-
precedented civil penalties, 6 disgorgements of profits, 7 and injunc-
tions,' as well as the Justice Department's criminal prosecutions. 9
One federal prosecutor has bluntly referred to the investment bank-
ers involved in this wave of trading scandals as "thieves."' He
stated: "[T]hey steal information and then they fence it. It's no dif-
ferent than if they were stealing ice skates."" As a result of the
flurry of criminal prosecutions, Congress is once again focusing in-
tensely on the need to regulate takeovers and insider trading more
rigorously and to increase the SEC's enforcement resources.' 2 How-
386 (1974) (holding that, since Florida law requires "actual damage" to the corporation,
the plaintiff failed to state a cause of action). See generally Carlton & Fischel, The Regula-
tion of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 857, 883 (1983) (discussing general common-law
rule that insider trading is permitted); Langevoort, Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Princi-
ple: A Post-Chiarella Restatement, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 16-18 (1982) (discussing insider
trading law after Chiarella).
5. The term "outside information" refers to information "generated by sources
outside the company whose shares are affected." Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, An
Initial Inquiry into the Responsibility to Disclose Market Information, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 778,
807-08 (1973). See also Seligman, The Reformulation of Federal Securities Law Concerning Non-
public Information, 73 GEo. L.J. 1083 (1985).
6. See, e.g., SEC v. Boesky, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
92,991 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (imposing civil penalty of $50 million).
7. See, e.g., SEC v. Pomerantz, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 1 93,008 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (ordering disgorgement of $39,925); SEC v. Boesky,
[1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,991 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (order-
ing disgorgement of $50 million); SEC v. Levine, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 92,761 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (ordering disgorgement of $11.7 million).
8. See, e.g., SEC v. Pomerantz, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 93,008 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); SEC v. Boesky, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) $ 92,991 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); SEC v. Musella, 578 F. Supp. 425 (S.D.N.Y.
1984).
9. See supra note 2.
10. Miller, U. S. Prosecutor of Insider Trading Bluntly Labels the Offense as Theft, Wall St. J.,
Dec. 24, 1986, at 6, col. 1.
11. Id.
12. D'Amato Introduces Comprehensive Proposal for Tender Offer Reform, 19 Sec. Reg. & L.
Rep. (BNA) 84 (Jan. 16, 1987); White House Task Force Reviewing Insider Trading Laws, 18
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1809 (Dec. 19, 1986); Ingersoll, Demand Rises for Law Defining
Insider Trading to Provide More Than a Gut Feeling as a Guide, Wall St. J., Mar. 26, 1987, at
70, col. 1. See also Langley, Companies, Securities Firms Enlist Top Lobbyists for Showdown over
Bid to Tighten Takeover Law, Wall St. J., Mar. 9, 1987, at 54, col. 1; Ingersoll, Bigger SEC
Budget, Clearer Definition of Insider Trading Backed by Senators, Wall St. J., Feb. 25, 1987, at 5,
col. 1; Ingersoll & Anders, Latest Insider Arrests Bring Urgency to Push for Overhaul, Wall St.
J., Feb. 13, 1987, at 10, col. 5; Hume, White House Task Force Will Consider Need for New
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ever, the concerns to be addressed in this commentary are those not
of the public at large, but of a new breed of private litigant: the
corporate client whose confidences have been betrayed by its invest-
ment banker. More specifically, does that client have a private cause
of action for securities fraud under the SEC's rule lOb-5 for any
damages sustained?
This commentary will begin by summarizing a recent complaint
filed in federal court to serve as a factual predicate for the analysis.
Then, a number of preliminary observations will be set forth that
amplify the factual predicate in order to provide a clearer context
for the discussion. Several of the hurdles presented by the limita-
tions on the scope of rule lOb-5 and the prerequisites for a private
cause of action will be considered. The commentary concludes that
legislative reform is necessary to provide private litigants with effec-
tive recourse under the federal securities laws for damages based on
misappropriation of nonpublic information.
II. THE FACTUAL PREDICATE
A useful construct for this discussion is presented by a recent
complaint filed by Litton Industries, Inc. against its former invest-
ment banker, Lehman Brothers Kuhn Loeb, Inc., and (among other
defendants) two of Lehman Brothers' former employees, Dennis Le-
vine and Ira Sokolow.' 3 Typical of securities fraud litigation, the
complaint seeks damages under a potpourri of federal and state
causes of action. They include section 10(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 (1934 Act)' 4 and rule lOb- 5 1 promulgated
Rules on Insider Trading, Wall St. J., Dec. 15, 1986, at 4, col. 2; Ingersoll, Lawmakers to
Probe Regulators'Failure to Catch Boesky Without Levine's Help, Wall St.J., Dec. 10, 1986, at 5,
col. 1; Blustein, Disputes Arise over Value of Laws on Insider Trading, Wall St. J., Nov. 17,
1986, at 28, col. 5; Ingersoll, Political Pressure Building to Stem Trading Excesses, Wall St. J.,
Nov. 17, 1986, at 29, col. 5.
13. Litton Indus., Inc. v. Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb, Inc., Dennis Levine, Ira B. Soko-
low, Bank Leu Int'l, LTD., Bank Leu A.G., Bernhard Meier, John R. Lademann, Bruno
Pletscher, Jean-Pierre Fraysse, Christian Schlatter, John Doe, Jane Doe and John Doe,
Inc., No. 86 Civ. 6447 (S.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 16, 1986) (all citations are to the First
Amended Complaint filed Sept. 25, 1986) [hereinafter Litton Complaint].
14. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982). The statute provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facil-
ity of any national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any se-
curity registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so regis-
tered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of
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thereunder, section 14(e) of the 1934 Act 6 and rule 14e-317
promulgated thereunder, section 1964(c) of the Racketeer Influ-
enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO),' common law fraud,
negligence, intentional interference with contractual relations,
breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and statutory fraud and
deceit under New York law.' 9 Because the analysis will focus on the
such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
15. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1986). Rule lOb-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails or of any facil-
ity of any national securities exchange-
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
16. 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1982). Section 14(e) of the 1934 Act provides a general prohi-
bition against "any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices" in connec-
tion with any tender offer. Id. The Supreme Court in Piper v. Chris Craft Industries,
430 U.S. 1 (1976), held that unsuccessful tender offerors have no implied cause of action
for damages under § 14(e). Id. at 42. However, the Court reserved the issues of
(1) whether the target corporation or its shareholders have standing under § 14(e), and
(2) whether the tender offeror has an action in equity for injunctive relief under § 14(e).
Id. at 42 n.28, 47 n.33. The Court again interpreted § 14(e) in Schreiber v. Burlington
Northern, Inc., 472 U.S. 1 (1985). In Schreiber the Court held that the "manipulative"
language contained in § 14(e) requires "conduct designed to deceive or defraud inves-
tors by controlling or artificially affecting the price of securities." Id. at 12 (citing Ernst
& Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976)). See generally Loewenstein, Section 14(e)
of the Williams Act and the Rule lOb-5 Comparisons, 71 GEO. L.J. 1311 (1983) (concluding
that scienter should not be an element of § 14(e) action and that plaintiffs need only
prove reliance if necessary to prove causation).
17. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1986). Basically, rule 14e-3 provides that once a "person
has taken a substantial step or steps to commence" a tender offer, any other person with
nonpublic, material information concerning the tender offer must wait "a reasonable
time" after the information is publicly disclosed before engaging in transactions involv-
ing the stock of the target company. This rule is often referred to as the "Chiarella
Rule" because the SEC promulgated the rule under § 14(e) of the 1934 Act soon after
its defeat in Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980). See L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS
OF SECURITIES REGULATION 868-69 (1983). Commentators have questioned the SEC's
authority to promulgate rule 14e-3 under § 14(e), but, in any event, it successfully pro-
vides a means for the SEC to further its enforcement efforts on the basis of the misap-
propriation theory. See Junewicz, The Appropriate Limits of Section 14(e) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1171 (1984).
18. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982). See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479
(1985). See generally Note, RICO and Securities Fraud: A Workable Limitation, 83 COLUM. L.
REV. 1513 (1983); RICO as a Securities Fraud Remedy-Fact or Fad?, Sec. & Fed. Corp. L.
Rep. 4 Uune 1983).
19. Litton Complaint, supra note 13, at 81-108.
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utility of rule 1 Ob-5 to the corporate client seeking recovery from its
investment bankers, the summary of the alleged operative facts is
limited to those directly related to Litton's rule lOb-5 claims against
Lehman and the two named employees.
Litton retained Lehman to provide investment banking advice
regarding the proposed acquisition of various companies in the de-
fense electronics industry, including Itek Corporation. 20 At an ini-
tial meeting, Litton's representatives met with Lehman's personnel,
including Sokolow, an employee in Lehman's mergers and acquisi-
tions department.2 Litton disclosed its acquisition interests, and
Lehman presented a number of tactical alternatives and recommen-
dations. 22 Subsequently, Litton decided to acquire Itek and com-
menced open market purchases of Itek common stock.23 Pursuant to
Lehman's advice, Litton developed a three-step acquisition plan:
(1) to purchase up to 4.9% of Itek's common stock in the open mar-
ket, (2) to negotiate a friendly acquisition of Itek's common stock,
involving a tender offer, and (3) to merge Itek with a wholly-owned
Litton subsidiary.24
Shortly thereafter, Lehman and Litton entered into a letter
agreement, labeled "confidential," setting forth the services to be
provided by Lehman in connection with the proposed acquisition,
Lehman's compensation schedule, and Litton's duty not to disclose
any of Lehman's advice to third parties. 25 Litton asserts that all dis-
closures of information to Lehman during their relationship were
pursuant to an express agreement by Lehman that Lehman and its
employees would maintain strict confidentiality. 26
The complaint avers an immediate breach of this duty by Soko-
low 27 and, secondarily, by Lehman, as his employer.28 Sokolow dis-
closed Lehman's acquisition plan to Levine, who was also employed
in Lehman's mergers and acquisitions department.29 The sine qua
non for Sokolow's disclosure, according to the complaint, was that
Levine would commence trading in Itek common stock while Lit-
ton's acquisition plan remained nonpublic and would reward Soko-
20. Id. at 19, 20.
21. Id. at 9 8, 21.
22. Id. at 22.
23. Id. at 23.
24. Id. at 22, 24.
25. Id. at 24-26.
26. Id. at 9 26.
27. Id. at 9 28.
28. Id. at 100.
29. Id. at 9 28.
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low with a share of the trading profits realized."0 To effectuate his
trades, Levine used a Bahamian corporation and its securities bro-
kerage accounts in New York,"' and he allegedly tipped a number of
persons, creating a chain reaction of tipper-tippee disclosures and
resultant trading based on Litton's nonpublic acquisition plan. 2
This trading activity, according to Litton, caused the price of Itek's
common stock on the New York Stock Exchange to rise sharply,
reaching and maintaining an artificially inflated level.33
Despite the upswing in the price of Itek common stock, Litton
held to its acquisition plan. It was able to negotiate a friendly acqui-
sition agreement with Itek representatives, and successfully con-
ducted a cash tender offer at a price per share representing a
substantial premium over the market price.3 4 After the tender offer
was publicly announced, Levine and certain other defendants sold
their Itek stock for a substantial profit.3 5 Although Litton concluded
its acquisition plan, causing Itek to be merged with a Litton subsidi-
ary, it seeks damages in the amount of $30 million from Lehman
and the other defendants.3 ' The crux of its damages claim is that
Sokolow's wrongful disclosure of the acquisition plan and the resul-
tant trading by various tippees significantly affected the cash tender
offer price negotiated with Itek by artificially inflating the market
37prices.
The factual predicate for Litton's rule 1Ob-5 claims is but a vari-
ant of a pattern reflected in a number of pending or threatened law-
suits.3' The facts can be more succinctly stated by symbolic
30. Id.
31. Id. at 11, 30.
32. Id. at 44 28-33.
33. Id. at $ 34.
34. Id. at 1 37, 38.
35. Id. at $$ 39, 40.
36. Id. at $ 116.
37. Id. at $$ 34, 35. As a result of their outsider trading, both Sokolow and Levine
were enjoined from further brokerage activities in an SEC enforcement action. In addi-
tion, both men were convicted of securities fraud. United States v. Sokolow, 18 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1642 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 1986); SEC v. Levine, 18 Sec. Reg. & L.
Rep. (BNA) 709 (S.D.N.Y. May 12, 1986).
38. See, e.g., FMC Corp. v. Ivan F. Boesky; Boesky & Kinder Partners, L.P.; Ivan F.
Boesky & Co., L.P.; IFB Managing Partnership, L.P.; Cambrian & General Securities,
p.l.c,; Beverly Hills Hotel Corp.; Farnsworth & Hastings Ltd.; Northview Corporation;
Seemala Partners, L.P.; Seemala Corp.; Ivan F. Boesky Corp.; Goldman, Sachs & Co.;
David S. Brown; Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc.; Ira B. Sokolow; Drexel Burnham Lam-
bert, Inc., and Dennis B. Levine, No. 86 C 9879 (N.D. Ill. filed Dec. 18, 1986). (The
complaint, alleging that FMC retained Goldman Sachs & Co. as its investment banking
firm in connection with a recapitalization of the company and that the defendants misap-
propriated related confidential information and used it to purchase or manipulate the
1228 [VOL. 46:1222
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reiteration. An acquiring corporation (A) retains an investment
banker (B), whose employee-insiders (BI) assist A's employee-insid-
ers (AI) in developing a confidential scheme to purchase all or a
controlling block of the securities of a target corporation (T) from
T's shareholders (TS). In an assumed breach of state law contrac-
tual and fiduciary duties to A and B, BI proceeds to purchase securi-
ties from TS in the open market prior to any public announcement
of A's acquisition plan and without any disclosure of A's plan to TS.
Similarly, although perhaps not simultaneously with BI's purchases,
A purchases shares from TS without disclosure of its plan. None of
A's securities are purchased by A or BI from A's shareholders (AS).
Because BI's trading increases the demand and trading volume in
T's securities, the price of those securities presumably increases,
thereby making A's plan more costly. A then seeks to hold BI and
their employer B liable for the misappropriation and wrongful use
of its nonpublic acquisition plan and claims as damages not the
amount of BI's trading profits, but the amount of the alleged in-
crease in the cost paid by A to effectuate the plan. Although other
remedies in tort and contract under state law are asserted and may
be available, A claims that its damages are recoverable under rule
lOb-5 because BI wrongfully misappropriated A's nonpublic infor-
mation in connection with the purchase of securities.
III. PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS
In undertaking an analysis of whether a private cause of action
under rule lOb-5 is available to A, a number of observations about
the factual predicate may be useful in clarifying the position of the
parties.
(1) Both A and BI were buyers of T's securities and, hence,
were never on different sides of any transactions in those securities.
(2) Assuming BI owed state law contractual and fiduciary du-
price of FMC stock, was dismissed for failure to demonstrate damages to the corpora-
tion; see Richards, FMC Suit Charging Boesky Action Cost Firm Is Dismissed, Wall St. J., Apr.
14, 1987, at 20, col. 3); Anheuser-Busch Cos., Inc. v. W. Paul Thayer, Billy Bob Harris,
A.G. Edwards, Inc., A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., William H. Mathis, Bear, Steams & Co.,
Bear, Stearns & Co., BSC Partners, Gayle L. Schroder, Malcolm B. Davis, Plus, Inc., and
Doyle L. Sharp, No. CA 3-85-0794-R (N.D. Tex. filed Apr. 26, 1985) (alleging that
Thayer, a corporate insider, disclosed material, nonpublic information about Busch's
planned acquisition of Cambell-Taggart to the other defendants as part of a fraudulent
insider trading scheme). See generally Hiltzik, Several Companies Consider Suing Boesky Over
Trades, L.A. Times, Nov. 26, 1986, § IV, at 1, col. 1; Lewin, Employer Role in Insider Suits,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1986, at D2, col. 1; Power, Insider Trading: Must Employers Pay Dam-
ages?, Wall St. J., Sept. 8, 1986, at 29, col. 3; Victor, Litton Case Raises Questions, Firms
Vulnerable to Insider Suits?, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 8, 1986, at 3, col. 1.
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ties to A and B, BI did not disclose to A an intention to breach any
of those duties.
(3) The parties, A, B, and BI, were all fully aware of A's non-
public acquisition plan.39
(4) A does not claim that any misrepresentation or omission
by BI was material or relied upon by A or otherwise caused A to
purchase T's securities.
(5) Both A and BI failed to disclose A's nonpublic acquisition
plan to TS at the time of their respective pre-announcement
purchases of T's securities, and A does not assert that it or BI
breached any duty of disclosure to TS.
(6) Public disclosure by A, B, or BI of the acquisition plan
prior to A's amicable agreement with T would have impeded A's
plan or resulted in significantly higher costs to A.
(7) Despite any increases in the market price of T's securities,
A purchased T's securities at the higher price plus a premium.
(8) Despite any increases in the market price of T's securities,
T's employee-insiders may not have agreed to cooperate with A on
the basis of any price lower than that ultimately paid by A.
(9) Assuming BI's purchases increased the price of T's securi-
ties and, accordingly, increased the price ultimately paid by A, bene-
fits of the increased price accrued to TS at the time the acquisition
plan was consummated.4"
39. No reference is made in the Litton Complaint to "materiality" or "reliance," two
critical elements of a rule lob-5 private cause of action. See infra notes 52-102 and ac-
companying text. See generally Helman, Rule lOb-5 Omissions Cases and the Investment Deci-
sion, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 399 (1982) (advising careful analysis of the plaintiff's
investment decision in rule lOb-5 cases).
40. The assumption that the misappropriator's purchases bear a causal connection
to price increases in a target corporation's securities is a difficult one. One writer has
stated that "the purchase of a target's shares in advance of a takeover ... bids up the
price of the target's shares and thereby makes the corporate action more expensive.
This reduces the value of the takeover to the firm." Carlton & Fischel, supra note 4, at
884. However, a recent study by the SEC's Office of the Chief Economist concludes that
pre-bid trading for target stock "is not necessarily an accurate indicator of insider trad-
ing." See Stock Trading Before the Announcement of Tender Offers: Insider Trading or Market
Anticipation?, Study by the SEC's Office of the Chief Economist, at 1 (released Mar. 10,
1987) [hereinafter Staff Study]. Rather, the study identified three influences-"media
speculation," a bidder's "foothold acquisition" in the target company, and whether the
bid is friendly or hostile-that could make the pre-bid activity not attributable to insider
trading. Id. at 2-3.
It is beyond the scope of this article to address whether the increased costs of the
tender offer resulting from improper trading are among the types of recoverable dam-
ages in a private cause of action under rule lob-5. In any event, a plaintiff must show a
causal connection between the deception and the damages claimed to have been suf-
fered. See, e.g., Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 13 (1985) ("since the
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(10) T's shareholders who sold to A, BI, or others prior to the
public disclosure of A's acquisition plan received fewer benefits of
the price increase in T's securities.
(11) To the extent proprietary interests in the nonpublic ac-
quisition plan existed pending public disclosure, they were held by
both A and B as co-creators of the nonpublic information, as evi-
denced by their confidential letter agreement. 4'
(12) B's liability under rule lOb-5, which ultimately would be
borne by B's shareholders, is dependent on BI's liability, whether
B's liability is based on aiding and abetting,42 controlling person, 43
deceptive and misleading acts alleged by the petitioner all occurred with reference to the
making of the second tender offer-when the injuries suffered by petitioner had already
been sustained-these acts bear no possible causal relationship to petitioner's alleged
injuries").
41. See Macey, From Fairness to Contract: The New Direction of the Rules Against Insider
Trading, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 9, 27, 30-39 (1984) ("The right to prohibit another from
trading on the basis of inside information must stem from a notion that information is a
form of property interest.").
42. Once the primary liability of the wrongdoer is established under rule lOb-5, the
wrongdoer's employer may be subject to secondary liability as an aider and abettor. To
establish aiding and abetting liability, the plaintiff must prove: (1) the existence of an
independent securities law violation committed by the primary wrongdoer; (2) the aider
and abettor had actual knowledge of the wrongful act; and (3) the aider and abettor
substantially assisted the wrongdoer in effectuating the violation. See Rolf v. Blyth, East-
man Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 44-47 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978); Kerbs
v. Fall River Indus., 502 F.2d 731, 740 (10th Cir. 1974). See generally Ruder, Multiple
Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, In Pari Delicto, Indem-
nification, and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 597 (1972); Note, Liability for Aiding and
Abetting Violations of Rule 10b-5: The Recklessness Standard in Civil Damages Actions, 62 TEX. L.
REV. 1087 (1984) (arguing that existing conflict among the circuits should be resolved in
favor of unrestricted application of recklessness standard to parties who aid and abet
rule lOb-5 violators); Note, The Private Action Against a Securities Fraud Aider and Abettor:
Silent and Inactive Conduct, 29 VAND. L. REV. 1233 (1976) (examining origins of aiding and
abetting liability and developing theory-of liability based on passive conduct).
43. Section 20(a) of the 1934 Act extends liability for the acts of one person to an-
other, who, through stock ownership, agency, or agreement, "controls" that person. 15
U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1982). The SEC, in rule 12b-2, has defined the term "control" to mean
"the possession, direct or indirect, of the power to direct ... the management and
policies of a person, whether through the ownership of voting securities, by contract, or
otherwise." 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 (1986). A controlling person may escape liability
under § 20(a) by showing that it has "acted in good faith and did not directly or indi-
rectly induce the act or acts constituting the violation or cause of action." 15 U.S.C.
§ 78t(a) (1982). See also Comment, Secondary Liability of Controlling Persons Under the Securi-
ties Acts: Toward an Improved Analysis, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 1345 (1978).
Currently, a split exists among the circuits as to whether § 20(a) would be the exclu-
sive remedy for a plaintiff seeking to impute liability to an investment banking firm for
the misdeeds of its employees. A majority of courts view "controlling person" liability
and respondeat superior as concurrent theories for imputing liability. See, e.g., Commerford
v. Olson, [Current Developments] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,809 (8th Cir. July 2,
1986); In re Atlantic Fin. Management, Inc., 784 F.2d 29 (1st Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107
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or respondeat superior theories.44
S. Ct. 2469 (1987); Henricksen v. Henricksen, 640 F.2d 880 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1097 (1981); Paul F. Newton & Co. v. Texas Commerce Bank, 630 F.2d 1111
(5th Cir. 1980); Marbury Management, Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1011 (1980); Kerbs v. Fall River Indus., 502 F.2d 731 (10th Cir. 1974);Johns
Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 422 F.2d 1124 (4th Cir. 1970); Armstrong, Jones & Co. v.
SEC, 421 F.2d 359 (6th Cir. 1970). But see Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175
(3d Cir. 1981); Christoffel v. E. F. Hutton & Co., 588 F.2d 665 (9th Cir. 1978). For
further discussion, see Fitzpatrick & Carman, Respondeat Superior and the Federal Securities
Laws: A Round Peg in a Square Hole, 12 HOFsTRA L. REV. 1 (1983); Fishel, Secondary Liability
Under Section 10(b) of the Securities Act of 1934, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 80 (1981); Note, Rule lOb-
5 and Vicarious Liability Based on Respondeat Superior, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 1513 (1981). See also
Brodsky, Controlling-Person Liability-A Conflict, 186 N.Y.L.J. 1 (July 15, 1981); Brodsky,
Brokerage Firm's Liability, 185 N.Y.LJ. 1 (Jan. 21, 1981). The majority view is based pri-
marily upon the rationale that the absence of respondeat superior liability in securities cases
could considerably change existing liability assumptions. See Marbury Management, Inc.
v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705, 716 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1011 (1980) ("there is no
warrant for believing that section 20(a) was intended to narrow the remedies of the
customers of brokerage houses or to create a novel defense in cases otherwise governed
by traditional agency principles").
44. In contrast to "controlling person" liability, the common-law doctrine of respon-
deat superior views the good faith of the principal or other controlling person as irrelevant
to the issue of liability. See Musewicz, Vicarious Employer Liability and Section 10(b): In
Defense of the Common Law, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 754 (1982); Note, Application of Common
Law Agency Principles to Actions Under the Securities Acts: Strict Liability for Employers, 32 MER-
CER L. REV. 1283, 1292 (1981). Under respondeat superior principles, an employer is liable
for all acts an employee committed "within the scope of employment." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228 (1958) (defining "scope of employment"); P. MECHEM, OUT-
LINE OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 366 (4th ed. 1952). Accordingly, scope of employment is
the key element in establishing respondeat superior liability. The phrase includes conduct
of the type the employee was employed to perform actuated by an intent to serve the
master. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228 (1958). The fact that an employee
acted for personal gain, however, does not necessarily cause the acts to be outside the
scope of employment. Brill, The Liability of an Employer for the Wilful Torts of His Servants,
45 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1, 10 (1968). Lord McNaghten in Lloyd v. Grace, Smith & Co.,
A.C. 716 (1912), All E.R. Reprints 51 (1911-13), adopted this rule, stating: "A principal
must be liable for the fraud of his agent committed in the course of the agent's employ-
ment and not beyond the scope of his agency, whether the fraud be committed for the
principal's benefit or not." All E.R. Rep. at 57. The United States Supreme Court
adopted this rule in Gleason v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 278 U.S. 349 (1929). In Gleason
the railroad company was found liable for the payment of a draft against a bill of lading
which was forged by the railroad's agent. The Court overturned Friedlander v. Texas &
Pacific Ry., 130 U.S. 416 (1899), and held that the "liability of the principal for the false
statement or other misconduct of the agent acting within the scope of his authority is
unaffected by his secret purpose or motives." 278 U.S. at 356. The rule has been widely
applied. See, e.g., Hydrolevel Corp. v. American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs, 635 F.2d
118, 125 (2d Cir. 1980) (stating that the Gleason rule "has not been questioned" and
induces "greater care to prevent misconduct by agents occupying especially sensitive or
responsible positions that invite reliance"); Ricketts v. Pennsylvania Ry., 153 F.2d 757,
759 (2d Cir. 1946) ("[iut is now settled ... that an agent does not cease to be acting
within the scope of his authority when he is engaged in a fraud upon a third person");
Kean v. National City Bank, 294 F. 214, 224 (6th Cir. 1923) ("The principal [may be
charged] with the knowledge of the agent, where the agent is acting within the scope of
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Not all of the foregoing observations, or others that could also
be stated, may prove determinative in any judicial resolution. Taken
together with the factual predicate, however, a clearer basis for anal-
ysis is presented.
IV. THE APPLICABILITY OF RULE 1OB-5
Most would agree that BI's conduct is reprehensible- morally,
legally, and economically. The Supreme Court has observed that
this type of trading may "even where permitted by law.., fall below
ethical standards of conduct."45 This assumes without discussion
the availability of appropriate remedies under state law, whether the
conduct is characterized as a breach of confidence46 or fiduciary
duty by an agent to a principal,4 7 as conversion,48 as misappropria-
tion of a trade secret 49 or confidential business information, 50 or as
his authority and for the principal, notwithstanding the personal fraud or adverse inter-
est of the agent."); Standard Surety & Casualty Co. v. Plantsville Nat'l Bank, 70 F. Supp.
954 (D. Conn. 1945) (holding bank liable to bond firm because the bond was issued on
the basis of information misrepresented to it by a bank cashier). See alo RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 262 (1958) ("[a] person who otherwise would be liable to an-
other for the misrepresentations of one apparently acting for him is not relieved from
liability by the fact that the servant or other agent acts entirely for his own purposes,
unless the other has notice of this"); id. § 395 (stating that an agent has a duty not to use
confidential information acquired during the course of the agency). For the text of
§ 395, see infra note 50.
45. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 661 n.21 (1983).
46. See F. CURRY, BREACH OF CONFIDENCE (1984); see generally Note, Breach of Confi-
dence: An Emerging Tort, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1426, 1428 (1982) (arguing that the essential
elements of a "confidential relationship" are "the assurance of secrecy and the reliance
it evokes," and that disclosure of confidential information obtained in a confidential re-
lationship has increasingly given rise to a tort action for the breach of confidence).
47. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 387 (1958) (stating that an agent has a
duty to act for the benefit of the principal); Note, Securities-Rule lOb-5-Corporate Out-
sider May Be Liable for Failure To Disclose or Abstain Under Rule lOb-5 Based on Employer-
Employee Fiduciary Relationship- United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981), 13
SETON HALL L. REV. 178 (1982).
48. "Conversion is an intentional exercise of dominion or control over a chattel
which so seriously interferes with the right of another to control it that the actor may
justly be required to pay the other the full value of the chattel." RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 222A(l) (1965); see also id. at § 228 (stating that exceeding authorized use of
chattel is conversion).
49. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 (1940). One is liable for the misappro-
priation or disclosure of a trade secret if the disclosure is in breach of confidence "re-
posed in him by the other in disclosing the secret to him." Id.
50. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 395 (1958). This section provides:
(Using or Disclosing Confidential Information) Unless otherwise agreed, an
agent is subject to a duty to the principal not to use or to communicate infor-
mation confidentially given him by the principal or acquired by him during the
course of or on account of his agency or in violation of his duties as agent, in
competition with or to the injury of the principal, on his own account or on
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a breach of an employment contract.5" Even those who generally
would view trading on nonpublic information as an acceptable part
of an executive compensation package have condemned such non-
consensual trading activity as economically inefficient.5
2
However, despite the admonition that federal securities law
should be read "flexibly to effectuate its remedial purposes, '53 not
all wrongful conduct somehow associated with securities is pro-
scribed by section 10(b) and rule lOb-5. Even when proscribed by
the substantive scope of these provisions, additional restrictions on
the implied private cause of action may pretermit a private litigant's
recovery. Accordingly, it first must be determined whether BI's
conduct falls within the scope of coverage under rule lOb-5, as de-
limited by section 10(b). Then, a determination must be made
whether A has standing to pursue its action, and, if so, whether it
can establish the requisite elements of a prima facie case.
A. The Scope of Rule lOb-5
The Supreme Court has not addressed the precise issue
whether rule lOb-5 is applicable to a person who, in breach of fidu-
ciary duties, misappropriates confidential information from one
behalf of another, although such information does not relate to the transaction
in which he is then employed, unless the information is a matter of general
knowledge.
51. See F. GURRY, supra note 46, at 94-122. The author states that a business secret
"is information which a firm generates about its own activities." In a business relation-
ship, the information is provided only for the purposes of a particular business relation-
ship. Thus, one is liable for a breach of confidence when the information is used in
breach of an obligation.
52. See Carlton & Fischel, supra note 4, at 869-72, 887 (arguing that nonconsensual
insider trading is an inefficient compensation scheme). See generally H. MANNE, INSIDER
TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKETS; Brudney, supra note 4, at 322 (arguing that if one
party possesses an informational advantage that public investors may not overcome,
transactions should be barred detailing "pervasive incentives" for insider trading); Eas-
terbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiaiy Privileges, and the Production of Information,
1981 SuP. CT. REV. 309, 332; Manne, Insider Trading and the Law Professors, 23 VAND. L.
REV. 547 (1970) (discussing discrepancies between legal and economic analyses of in-
sider trading); Scott, Insider Trading: Rule 1Ob-5, Disclosure and Corporate Privacy, 9J. LEGAL
STUD. 801 (1980) (exploring different views on objectives of rule 1Ob-5 and their implica-
tions). For analysis of the effects of insider trading on internal corporate efficiency, see
Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 VA. L. REV. 1 (1980); Haft, The Effect
of Insider Trading Rules on the Internal Efficiency on the Large Corporation, 80 MICH. L. REV.
1051 (1982).
53. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 200 (1976). The Court explained
that a private cause of action under § 10(b) and rule lOb-5 requires a showing of"inten-
tional or willful conduct designed to deceive or defraud investors." Id. at 199. See also
Reiss v. Pan Am. World Airways, 711 F.2d 11, 14 (2d Cir. 1983) ("[T]here must be proof
that the nondisclosure was intended to mislead.").
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party to make trading profits in the securities of another. The issue
was excluded in specific language from the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Chiarella v. United States,54 the only case thus far presented to
it involving an outsider trading on outside information.55 In
Chiarella an employee (BI) of a financial printing firm (B) utilized
confidential information provided by the firm's clients (A) to reap
trading profits in the securities of companies (T) those clients
planned to acquire.56 BI was-indicted and convicted for violations
of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5.5 7 On appeal the SEC asserted two
arguments: (1) BI's misappropriation and use of confidential infor-
mation from A operated as a rule lOb-5 fraud against A, and (2) BI's
purchases based on information misappropriated from A operated
as a rule 1Ob-5 fraud against TS, the shareholders of T who sold dur-
ing the subject period.5 8 Because the first misappropriation argu-
ment had not been submitted to the jury at trial, the Court
addressed only the second argument.59
In rejecting the notion that BI committed lOb-5 fraud against
TS, the Court reasoned that BI's silence or nondisclosure would sat-
isfy the "deception" requirement imposed by section 10(b) and rule
lOb-5 only if BI was subject to a duty to disclose.6" This duty, ac-
cording to the Court, must arise from a fiduciary relationship of
trust and confidence between the parties to a transaction. 6' None
54. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
55. Id. at 236. The Court noted that the government's brief offered an alternative
theory to support Chiarella's conviction:
It argues that petitioner breached a duty to the acquiring corporation when
he acted upon information that he obtained by virtue of his position as an em-
ployee of a printer employed by the corporation. The breach of this duty is
said to support a conviction under § 10(b) for fraud perpetrated upon both the
acquiring corporation and the seller.
We need not decide whether this theory has merit for it was not submitted
to the jury.
Id. at 235-36. The Court concluded that it would not uphold the conviction simply on
the jury's determination that Chiarella's nondisclosure of material, nonpublic informa-
tion in transactions with the shareholders of the target corporation operated as a fraud
upon the shareholders. Id. at 236.
56. Id. at 224.
57. Id. at 225.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 236. The Court has reiterated its reservation of the issue whether rule 1Ob-
5 liability may be predicated solely on the misappropriation and use of material, non-
public information, irrespective of any duty to disclose. See Bateman Eichler, Hill Rich-
ards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 312 n.21 (1985).
60. 445 U.S. at 237 n.21.
61. Id. at 232-33.
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was found.62 BI was not an insider of T, was not an agent of T or
TS, and otherwise had no fiduciary duties to T or TS. Thus, the
Court found no duty to disclose and, accordingly, no deception and
no fraud under rule lOb-5.6 3 The Court's reasoning applies with
equal force to A, who also purchased securities from TS without
disclosing the nonpublic information regarding the acquisition
plan.' The Court refused, absent supporting evidence of congres-
sional intent, to recognize "a general duty between all participants
in market transactions to forego action based on material nonpublic
information."65
The Court's conclusion was based in substantial part on its
prior holding in Santa Fe Industries v. Green,66 which dealt with the
62. Id. Justice Powell explained:
[T]he element required to make silence fraudulent-a duty to disclose-is ab-
sent in this case. No duty could arise from petitioner's relationship with the
sellers of the target company's securities, for petitioner had no prior dealings
with them. He was not their agent, he was not a fiduciary, he was not a person
in whom the sellers had placed their trust and confidence. He was, in fact, a
complete stranger who dealt with the sellers only through impersonal market
transactions.
Id.
The Second Circuit, in the context of a private action under rule lOb-5, has held
that, once a duty to disclose is established, that duty runs even to strangers in imper-
sonal market transactions. Furthermore, the mere breach of this duty satisfies the causal
connection requirement. See Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495
F.2d 228, 237 (2d Cir. 1974) ("[D]efendants owed a duty ... [to disclose] not only to the
purchasers of the actual shares sold by defendants.., but to all persons who during the
same period purchased Douglas stock in the open market without knowledge of the ma-
terial inside information .. "). See also Wilson v. Comtech Telecommunications Corp.,
648 F.2d 88, 99 (2d Cir. 1981) ("[D]uty of disclosure is owed only to those investors
trading contemporaneously with the insiders."); Elkind v. Liggett & Meyers, Inc., 635
F.2d 156, 169 (2d Cir. 1980) (same position).
The Sixth Circuit has refused to impose civil liability in the context of impersonal
market transactions. Since the insider did not induce the stranger to sell, the court has
found the causal connection lacking. See Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307, 318 (6th
Cir. 1976) ("[D]efendants' act of trading with third persons was not causally connected
with any claimed loss by plaintiffs who traded on the impersonal market and who were
otherwise unaffected by the wrongful acts."). See also Moss v. Morgan Stanley, 719 F.2d
5 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1983); Laventhall v. General Dynamics Corp., 704
F.2d 407 (8th Cir. 1983); Walton v. Morgan Stanley, 623 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1980) (cited
with approval in Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 662 n.22 (1983)).
63. 445 U.S. at 235.
64. Id. at 231 n.14. The Court noted with approval the Second Circuit's decision in
General Time Corp. v. Talley Indus., 403 F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
1026 (1969), determined that, absent a fiduciary relationship to the sellers, a tender
offeror did not violate § 10(b) when it made pre-announcement purchases of the target
company's securities. This holding, according to the Court, was consistent with its
Chiarella analysis. 445 U.S. at 231 n.14.
65. Id. at 233.
66. 430 U.S. 462 (1977). For a discussion of the implications of the Court's holding
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converse principle. While Chiarella held a material nondisclosure in-
sufficient absent a fiduciary duty to speak, Santa Fe held the breach
of a fiduciary duty insufficient absent a material nondisclosure.67
The Court in Santa Fe was confronted with the issue whether a
breach of fiduciary duty of fairness that involved the purchase of
securities in a merger was within the scope of rule lOb-5.6" Rule
lOb-5 fraud, the Court concluded, simply did not embrace "all
breaches of fiduciary duty in connection with a securities transac-
tion."' 69 The federalization of state law fiduciary duty could not be
premised on the language of section 10(b) or rule 1Ob-5, in light of
congressional intent that focused not on fairness but on
disclosure.70
The Court's decisions in Chiarella and Santa Fe, read together,
support conclusions that (1) neither A nor BI had a fiduciary duty to
TS and, hence, nondisclosure to TS does not violate rule 1Ob-5, and
(2) BI's breach of its fiduciary duty to A, without a material nondis-
closure to A, does not violate rule lOb-5. BI's nondisclosure to A
did not pertain directly to T's securities or to A's nonpublic acquisi-
tion plan-both A and BI obviously possessed that information-
but rather to BI's failure to disclose the intent to breach, and the
breach itself, of the fiduciary duty owed by BI to A and B. In a non-
disclosure analysis, the issue becomes whether a failure to disclose a
breach of fiduciary duty is within the scope of rule lOb-5.
The view has been expressed that failure to disclose a breach of
a fiduciary duty is simply insufficient under Santa Fe to constitute a
violation of section 10(b).7' If one disagrees, the possibilities for
in Santa Fe, see Farrara & Steinberg, A Reappraisal of Santa Fe: Rule 10b-5 and the New
Federalism, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 263 (1980); Langevoort, Fraud and Deception by Securities
Professionals, 61 TEX. L. REV. 1247 (1983).
67. 430 U.S. at 479-80.
68. Id. at 470-71.
69. Id. at 472.
70. Id. at 477-80.
71. See Biesenbach v. Guenther, 588 F.2d 400 (3d Cir. 1978). In Biesenbach the mi-
nority shareholders alleged that directors of the corporation breached their fiduciary
duties in connection with loans they made to the corporation. Id. at 401. The terms of
the loans were designed to give the directors control of the corporation through repay-
ment in the corporation's securities. Id. The plaintiffs contended that the failure to
disclose this breach of fiduciary duty was a misrepresentation or omission sufficient to
constitute a violation of rule lOb-5. Id. at 402. The Third Circuit, in rejecting this claim,
stated: "In effect, appellants are stating that the failure to disclose the breach of fiduci-
ary duty is a misrepresentation sufficient to constitute a violation of the Act. We refuse
to adopt this approach which would clearly circumvent the Supreme Court's holding in
Santa Fe." Id. The court concluded that "the unclean heart" was not actionable under
rule lOb-5, whether disclosed or not. Id.
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circumvention of Santa Fe's holding would render it meaningless.
To come within the scope of rule lOb-5, a plaintiff would need only
to amend the complaint for breach of fiduciary duty by adding an
averment that the breach was not disclosed. Even if the scope of
rule lOb-5 is broadly construed, despite Santa Fe's restrictions, to
include nondisclosure of a breach of fiduciary duty, the materiality72
of this nondisclosure is at least questionable under the prevailing
definition established in TSC Industries v. Northway, Inc.7" To para-
phrase this issue, would BI's disclosure in advance of the breach
have significantly affected a reasonable investor's decision to
purchase T's securities?"4 Given the observations that A effected
much larger purchases without public disclosure of its plan and con-
tinued to pursue its plan despite substantial escalation in the market
price of T's securities, this is doubtful. As a reasonable investor, A
in all likelihood presumed that takeover rumors and resultant trad-
ing would inevitably occur following its "window" purchases,75 with
consequential increases in the price of T's securities. Reference
should be made to the preliminary observation that A does not as-
72. The term "material" is not defined in the 1934 Act, but has been defined by the
SEC in rule 12b-2:
The term "material," when used to qualify a requirement for the furnishing of
information as to any subject, limits the information required to those matters
to which there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would at-
tach importance in determining whether to buy or sell the securities registered.
17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 (1986).
73. 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
74. See id. at 449. The Court, in the context of a proxy solicitation, phrased the
materiality standard as follows:
[A]n omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable
shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote .... It does
not require proof of a substantial likelihood that disclosure of the omitted fact
would have caused the reasonable investor to change his vote. What the stan-
dard does contemplate is a showing of a substantial likelihood that, under all
the circumstances, the omitted fact would have assumed actual significance in
the deliberations of the reasonable shareholder. Put another way, there must
be a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have
been viewed by a reasonable investor as having significantly altered the "total
mix" of information made available.
Id. Compare the SEC's definition, supra note 72.
75. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(l) (1982); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1 (1986). Section 13(d)
of the 1934 Act provides for a 10-day window after a person acquires beneficial owner-
ship of a five percent threshold of a target's stock to disclose his intentions to the target,
to the securities exchange on which the stock is traded, and to the SEC. See L. Loss,
supra note 17, at 573-74. The Senate is currently considering a bill to amend § 13(d)
that would reduce the window period to five days and the threshold to two percent.
Simon Proposes Bill to Limit 13(d) Window, Prohibit Greenmail, 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA)
219 (Feb. 13, 1987).
76. See Staff Study, supra note 40, at 1-2.
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sert that BI's nondisclosure was material or otherwise affected A's
decision to purchase T's securities. On the other hand, if BI's intent
had been disclosed prior to the breach, A or B, perhaps with the
SEC's assistance, may have been able to dissuade BI from the course
of action taken. In any event, the issue of "materiality" is clearly a
potential roadblock to A in its efforts to show that BI's conduct falls
within the proscriptions of rule lOb-5.
It has been argued that BI's conduct may come within the scope
of rule 1Ob-5 pursuant to a theory based upon the misappropriation
of confidential information, rather than upon the failure to disclose
a material fact. But any misappropriation theory must rest on an act
of deception as to a material fact. This conclusion, reached in an
unbroken line of Supreme Court decisions interpreting rule lOb-
5,77 cannot be debated seriously. If there was no duty to disclose to
TS under Chiarella, then the only duty to disclose ran to A and B. In
other words, A and B stood in a position to be deceived by BI and
were in fact deceived by BI's failure to disclose an intended breach
of fiduciary duty. However, Chief Justice Burger and Justices Bren-
nan, Blackmun, and Marshall indicated either in concurring or dis-
senting opinions in Chiarella that misappropriation was theft, and
securities trading using stolen information worked the requisite de-
ception.7" Justices Blackmun and Marshall went even further, stat-
ing that even if Chiarella's intentions had been disclosed to and
blessed by those to whom he owed fiduciary duties, his conduct
would have violated rule lOb-5.79 Justice Stevens suggested in his
concurring opinion that at least an arguable case could be posited in
support of the misappropriation theory without conflicting with the
majority opinion in Chiarella.a°
The construction of the argument alluded to by Justice Stevens
would necessarily incorporate a tenet that the act of misappropria-
tion, regardless of any disclosure obligation, is equivalent to the
requisite deception.8 ' While it is true that theft may be accom-
plished by deception, it is also true that not all theft is deceptive. If
the theft were fully disclosed to A and B prior to actual use of the
77. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222
(1980); Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. 185 (1976); Superintendent of Ins. v. Banker's Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6
(1971).
78. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 239 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 245, (Burger, CJ.,
dissenting); id. at 245-46 (Blackmun and Marshall, JJ., concurring).
79. Id. at 246.
80. Id. at 237, 238 (Stevens, J., concurring).
81. Id.
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confidential information by BI, it is difficult to pinpoint the decep-
tion. If BI actually had stolen T's securities from A and B in an
armed robbery, criminal theft would have occurred but not the de-
ceptive conduct proscribed by section 10(b). No evidence of con-
gressional intent exists in the language or history of section 10(b) to
support this extension in scope of rule lOb-5.12 Under Chiarella, ab-
sent any duty to TS, actionable deception must rest on BI's nondis-
closure to A and B.
In addition to the issue whether BI's conduct was tantamount to
a fraudulent nondisclosure of a material fact, another issue substan-
tially more burdensome is whether BI's nondisclosure to A was "in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security," as required by
rule lOb-5. s3 This "in connection with" requirement is pertinent
both to the scope of rule lOb-5 generally84 and to the plaintiff's
standing to bring a private cause of action.8 5
To establish the requisite connection with the fraud, a determi-
nation must be made concerning which purchases or sales are to be
connected. As previously observed, both A and BI made purchases
of T's securities, which, of course, also involved corresponding sales
82. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194-206 (1976) (discussing legis-
lative history of § 10(b)).
83. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(c) (1986). For the full text of this regulation, see supra
note 15.
84. See, e.g., Liberty Nat'l Ins. Holding Co. v. Charter Co., 734 F.2d 545, 555 (11th
Cir. 1984) ("The case law reveals that in order for this element ["in connection with"] to
be satisfied there must be some causal relationship between the alleged deception and
some consequent purchase or sale. Courts have spoken of this connection in terms of
reliance and causation."); Tully v. Mott Supermarkets, Inc., 540 F.2d 187, 194 (3d Cir.
1976) (" 'in connection with the purchase or sale' of any security, contemplates a causal
connection between the alleged fraud and the purchase or sale of stock").
85. See, e.g., Bochicchio v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 647 F. Supp. 1426,
1430 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (dismissing securities investor's claim against investment firm for
alleged misuse of securities trading accounts for failure to state a claim because the "in
connection with the purchase or sale of securities" requirement was not satisfied); Cit-
ron v. Rollins Env. Servs., Inc., [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
93,115 (D. Del. 1986) (holding that a corporation lacks standing to assert a § 10(b) claim
because the corporation was neither a purchaser nor seller); Baker v. Wheat First Sec.,
[1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,111 (S.D.W. Va. 1986)
(holding that a broker-dealer is not subject to federal securities fraud liability merely for
forging a letter to authorize the transfer of funds from an investor's account; the transfer
of funds is not "connected with the purchase or sale of securities" and, thus, the inves-
tors do not have standing); Davidge v. White, 377 F. Supp. 1084, 1086-87 (S.D.N.Y.
1974) (holding that a trustee lacks standing to bring a § 10(b) action for a company to
recover profits illegally made by a company director in possession of nonpublic informa-
tion because neither the trustee nor the company were purchasers or sellers in the direc-
tor's transactions). See also Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723
(1975). See infra notes 96-120 and accompanying text.
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of T's securities by TS. Because, under Chiarella, TS was not
deceived, TS's sales should be excluded from consideration. Be-
cause BI was not deceived, BI's purchases should be excluded as
well. Attention must then be directed to A's purchases of T's securi-
ties. A major difficulty in connecting BI's deception of A with A's
purchases is that the deception itself did not pertain to the intrinsic
characteristics of the securities purchased by A, to their investment
value, or to the elements of the actual securities transactions be-
tween A and TS.86 The deception pertained solely to BI's intent to
breach fiduciary obligations to A and B by misusing information
about A's market strategies in purchasing T's securities. It is un-
clear whether this constitutes a sufficient nexus between BI's decep-
tion and A's purchase of securities. Although lower court authority
is available,87 this issue cannot be resolved satisfactorily by refer-
ence to Supreme Court precedent. The Supreme Court addressed
the "in connection with" requirement, although not definitively, in
Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life and Casualty Co. 88 Because
that case involved a private cause of action, it is more appropriately
considered in the ensuing discussion of A's standing to sue under
rule lOb-5. 89
The SEC, encouraged by the concurring and dissenting opin-
ions in Chiarella, has pursued its misappropriation theories with a
vengeance. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit has found the argument especially persuasive, at least in crimi-
nal and administrative enforcement proceedings. One of its
decisions, United States v. Newman,90 exemplifies the position devel-
oped by the court. The Newman facts can be restated using the sym-
bolic references to the parties previously established in the factual
predicate for this commentary. During a five year period BI misap-
propriated confidential merger and takeover information from A
and B and made substantial trading profits in the securities con-
cerned. 91 In prosecuting BI for criminal violations of section 10(b)
and rule lOb-5, the government (G) premised BI's duty to disclose
86. See Tully v. Mott Supermarkets, Inc., 540 F.2d 187, 194 (3d Cir. 1976) ("'in
connection with the purchase or sale' of any security contemplates a causal connection
between the alleged fraud and the purchase or sale of stock").
87. See, e.g., United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 18 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 863 (1983).
88. 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
89. See infra notes 96-120 and accompanying text.
90. 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983).
91. Id. at 15.
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not upon a duty to TS but upon a duty to A and B.9 2 Subscribing to
Chief Justice Burger's dissent in Chiarella, the court concluded that
BI's conduct was actionable deception of A and B.93 Unfortunately,
the court did not distinguish between BI's nondisclosure to A and B
and BI's theft of the subject information. It is unclear whether the
court viewed the theft as the requisite deception or, instead, whether
it viewed BI's nondisclosure of the breach as deceptive. The latter is
at least suggested by the court's use of the term "deceitful
misappropriation." 4
Concerned only with the scope of rule lOb-5 and not with the
standing issue which arises in private litigation, the Newman court
rather summarily concluded that BI's fraud was "in connection
with" the purchase of a security.95 Interestingly, the nexus found by
the court was not a causal one related to purchases by A. Instead,
an arrow was drawn from BI's fraud to BI's purchase of a security.
Restated, the court held that it was a criminal violation of section
10(b) and rule lOb-5 for BI to defraud A and B in connection with
BI's purchase of a security from TS, despite the Chiarella view that
TS was not at all deceived. If one completes this reductio ad absurdum,
the question might arise whether BI defrauded himself. This under-
scores the question, "Who's suing who?" In Newman it was G
against BI.9 6 Fortunately, the Second Circuit has not applied a simi-
lar rationale in private actions under rule lOb-5.
92. Id. at 15-16.
93. Id. at 17. The Second Circuit stated:
By sullying the reputations of Courtois' and Antoniu's employers [B] as safe
repositories of client confidences, appellee and his cohorts [BI] defrauded
those employers as surely as if they took their money .... Appellee and his
cohorts [BI] also wronged Morgan Stanley's and Kuhn Loeb's clients [A],
whose takeover plans were keyed to target company stock prices fixed by mar-
ket forces, not artificially inflated through purchases by purloiners of confiden-
tial information.
Id.
94. See id. at 18.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 14. Relying extensively on Newman, one court has noted that the govern-
ment may be the only proper plaintiff in a suit using the misappropriation theory:
Because of the judicially-created standing requirement limiting private rule
lOb-5 damage claims to purchasers or sellers of securities, the extension of
liability under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 made possible by the misappropri-
ation theory will be useful only for actions instituted by government agen-
cies. . . . Prudent exercise of these governmental agencies' inherent
prosecutorial discretion no doubt will limit even further the actions brought
under the misappropriation theory.
SEC v. Tome, 638 F. Supp. 596, 618 n.41 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citations omitted).
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B. Standing to Sue Under Rule 1Ob-5
A significant impasse to A's private cause of action is the spe-
cialized standing requirement imposed by rule 1Ob-5. In Birnbaum v.
Newport Steel Corp. 97 the Second Circuit established the rule that only
a defrauded purchaser or seller of securities has standing to bring
an implied private right of action under rule 1Ob-5.98 In its view, the
language of the rule, which proscribes "fraud or deceit upon any
person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security,"
means "any person" who was defrauded in connection with that per-
son's purchase or sale of a security.99 This construction finds sup-
port in the SEC's stated purpose for the rule's adoption, to close "a
loophole in the protections against fraud ... prohibiting [any per-
son] from buying securities if they engage in fraud in their
purchase."10 0 The Second Circuit concluded that section 10(b) "was
directed solely at that type of misrepresentation or fraudulent prac-
tice usually associated with the sale or purchase of securities," and
was not directed at "fraudulent mismanagement" or "a breach of
fiduciary duty by corporate insiders.., using their position to profit
in the sale or exchange of corporate securities."'' The Supreme
Court subsequently adopted Birnbaum's purchaser-seller rule in Blue
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drugstores.'"2
The Birnbaum rule, as adopted in Blue Chip Stamps, should not be
construed simplistically as only requiring that a plaintiff be a pur-
chaser or seller of securities, regardless of whether the deception
relates to those securities. It also requires a nexus between the
fraud and the purchase or sale of the securities. Previously in this
commentary, the only nexus identified in the factual predicate, al-
beit tenuous, was between BI's deception of A and B and A's
purchases of T's securities. The Second Circuit in Newman, a crimi-
nal action, stretched the "in connection with" language to find a
nexus between BI's deception and BI's purchases of T's securi-
ties.10 3 However, the Second Circuit in Birnbaum, a private action,
ruled that the nexus must be between the defrauded plaintiff and
that plaintiff's purchase or sale of a security.'0 4 Much of the confu-
97. 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952).
98. Id. at 464.
99. Id. at 463.
100. SEC Release No. 32-30, May 21, 1942.
101. 193 F.2d at 464.
102. 421 U.S. 723, 749 (1975).
103. 664 F.2d 12, 18 (2d Cir. 1981).
104. 193 F.2d at 464.
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sion may be attributable to the Supreme Court's opinion in Superin-
tendent of Insurance.' In that case the Supreme Court was
confronted with a rule 10b-5 private action in which an insurance
company, a seller of securities, "was duped into believing that it, the
seller, would receive the proceeds" from the sale.' 0 6 Although the
insiders misappropriating those proceeds were not buyers or sellers
of the subject securities, the Court found a sufficient nexus between
the fraud and the issuer's sale of securities.'0 7 The deception per-
tained to the consideration to be paid for the securities, a significant
element of the seller's securities transaction.'0 8 Thus, the insiders'
deception of the seller included not only a nondisclosure of their
breach of fiduciary duties, but also a misrepresentation of a material
fact constituting an essential element of the sale. This clearly con-
trasts with BI's nondisclosure of an intent to breach a fiduciary duty,
unaccompanied by any misrepresentation or nondisclosure relating
to the subject securities. It is this distinction that marks the line
between the state law of fiduciary duty and the federal law of rule
1Ob-5. Unfortunately, the Second Circuit in Newman ' 09 and similar
cases has seized upon Justice Douglas' reference in Superintendent of
Insurance to deceptive conduct "touching" the sale of securities." 0
The use of the term "touching," according to Professor Loss, may
be more attributable to Justice Douglas' literary style than to some
expansive construction of the "in connection with" requirement."'
The Second Circuit in Chemical Bank v. Arthur Anderson & Co.," 2
a private action, refused to accord Justice Douglas' "touching" lan-
guage the expansive effect the court gave the term in Newman. In-
stead, it agreed with and quoted Professor Loss' interpretation that
no expansion of the "in connection with" requirement was in-
tended.'" 3 In Chemical Bank the requisite sale of securities was a par-
ent corporation's pledge of its subsidiary's stock to secure the
plaintiff bank's loan to the subsidiary.' The requisite deception
was the parent corporation's allegedly false financial statements de-
105. 404 U.S. 6 (1971). See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
106. 404 U.S. at 9.
107. Id. at 10.
108. Id.
109. 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).
110. Id. at 18. In Superintendent of Insurance Justice Douglas stated: "The crux of the
present case is that [plaintiff] suffered an injury as a result of deceptive practices touch-
ing its sale of securities .. " 404 U.S. at 12-13.
111. L. Loss, supra note 17, at 904.
112. 726 F.2d 930 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 884 (1984).
113. Id. at 942.
114. Id. at 943.
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livered to the bank prior to consummation of the loan transac-
tion." 5 Noting that the Supreme Court had side-stepped the issue
in Rubin v. United States,' j6 udge Friendly stated that misrepresenta-
tions or omissions that are involved in a securities transaction but
do not pertain to the securities themselves cannot form the basis for
a violation of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5." '7 Judge Friendly's
statement regarding the scope of rule 1Ob-5 is especially instructive:
The purpose of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 is to protect
persons who are deceived in securities transactions-to
make sure that buyers of securities get what they think they
are getting and that sellers of securities are not tricked into
parting with something for a price known to the buyer to
be inadequate or for a consideration known to the buyer
not to be what it purports to be." 8
The nexus between BI's nondisclosure of an intent to breach a
fiduciary duty to A and A's purchases of T's securities is even more
remote than the connection found inadequate in Chemical Bank. The
deception not only fails to pertain to the securities themselves, but,
unlike Chemical Bank, the deception does not form a part of the
transaction in which the securities were sold. BI's conduct is analo-
gous to that of an attorney who promises a client that he or she will
perform all fiduciary duties faithfully in managing the client's invest-
ments while secretly intending to steal the client's securities. In
Pross v. Katz "' the Second Circuit held on these facts that the attor-
ney, who subsequently did steal his client's securities, had not vio-
lated rule 10b-5.120 The court concluded that to hold otherwise
would render Santa Fe meaningless and would imprudently extend
the reach of rule lOb-5 to cover every conversion of property that
involves securities. 12 ' A's encounter with the "in connection with"
115. Id.
116. See 449 U.S. 424 (1981) (holding the pledge of stock for a loan to be an "offer or
sale" of securities under § 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933).
117. 726 F.2d at 943-45.
118. Id. at 943.
119. 784 F.2d 455 (2d Cir. 1986).
120. Id. at 458. In this case, Pross, a dentist, purchased securities in a limited partner-
ship interest upon the recommendation of Katz, Pross' attorney, and the real estate de-
veloper who controlled the partnership. Id. at 456. Despite alleged promises to
"manage Pross' investments faithfully," Katz allegedly took fraudulent steps to divest
Pross of his investments. Id. at 456-57. The court held that the breach of a promise
faithfully to perform fiduciary duties while secretly intending to breach that duty does
not violate rule lob-5. Id. at 458.
121. 784 F.2d at 458. The Second Circuit stated: "The complaint here alleges no
more than a conversion of property that happened to involve securities. We are unwill-
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requirement should fare no better. Absent a greater nexus between
BI's deception and A's purchase, the standing requirement under
rule lOb-5 is not satisfied.
C. The Elements of a Private Cause of Action
The failure by A to satisfy the standing requirement is, of
course, fatal to its private cause of action under rule lOb-5. It is,
therefore, unnecessary to examine at great length whether the fac-
tual predicate might otherwise establish a prima facie case. In addi-
tion to a showing that the requisite deception occurred in
connection with the purchase or sale of a security, other elements
include (1) the misrepresentation or omission of a fact, (2) which
fact is material, (3) which is made or omitted with scienter or the
intent to deceive, (4) which is justifiably relied upon by the plaintiff,
(5) and which results in damages to the plaintiff.' 22 The federal
courts have not yet analyzed these elements in the precise context
presented by the factual predicate considered in this commentary.
However, the Second Circuit has been faced with a private action
corollary of Newman, although it involved a different alignment of
the parties. Moss v. Morgan Stanley 123 does not involve an action
brought by A against B and BI but, rather, an action brought by TS
against B and BI.' 24 Nevertheless, Moss provides a useful analogue
to A's litigation.
The Newman facts, reconsidered in a private action by the same
court in Moss, were substantially similar to the factual predicate ad-
dressed in this commentary. Confidential information regarding A's
acquisition initiatives, developed by A and B, was misappropriated
and used by BI to make trading profits in T's securities. 125 In New-
man the alignment of the parties was G against BI, and the court
concluded that BI was criminally liable under rule lOb-5.' 26 In Moss
the alignment of the parties was TS against B and BI. 1 27 The plain-
tiff TS sought to represent a class of T's shareholders who had sold
ing to extend the reach of securities laws to every conversion of a security." Id. at 459.
See also Bochicchio v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 647 F. Supp. 1426, 1430
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) ("[T]he conversion of securities, even if it occurs from a brokerage ac-
count, does not state a claim under § 10(b).").
122. See Harris v. Union Elec. Co., 787 F.2d 355, 362 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
94 (1986).
123. 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1025 (1984).
124. Id. at 8-9.
125. See id.
126. 664 F.2d at 15.
127. 719 F.2d at 8-9.
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securities in the open market contemporaneously with BI's open
market purchases.' 2s Guided by Chiarella, the Second Circuit con-
cluded that BI, like Chiarella, had no fiduciary relationship with TS
and, consequently, had no duty to disclose.' 29 Absent a duty to dis-
close, BI's nondisclosure could not satisfy the deception require-
ment mandated by section 10(b). Efforts by TS to "piggyback"
upon the duty owed by BI to A and B met a stonewall. The court
concluded: "There is no 'duty in the air' to which any plaintiff can
attach his claim."' 130
Reconciliation of Newman and Moss is an exercise in frustration.
In Moss the court could not find the requisite deception. It did not
consider the "in connection with the purchase or sale" requirement
because there was no deception of TS to connect with any securities
transaction. The court's disinclination to provide a windfall recov-
ery to TS solely to discourage BI's tortious conduct against A and B
suggests that the court would not have found a sufficient connec-
tion.' 3 ' BI's deception not only failed to deceive TS, but the subject
matter of the deception did not pertain to the securities that TS
sold. In Newman, on the other hand, the court seemed determined to
punish BI for the deception of A and B, without regard to whether
the subject matter of the deception pertained to A's or TS's securi-
ties transactions. One can only surmise that the result is due to the
juxtaposition of policies against windfall damages and in favor of
criminal sanctions for deception. Thus, the court may have chosen
to read the "in connection with the purchase or sale" phrase of rule
1Ob-5 more strictly in a private action than in a criminal proceeding,
in which the mere "touching" of any securities transaction seems to
be enough. Interestingly, the Second Circuit in Newman seeks to
protect the general public by incarcerating BI for the tortious de-
ception of A and B, while conceding in Moss that BI owes no duty of
disclosure to the general public.
The Second Circuit's fast and loose analysis of the "in connec-
tion with" requirement in the criminal context will be scrutinized by
the Supreme Court in Carpenter v. United States.'3 2 In this case, confi-
dential information regarding an employer's publication schedules
was misappropriated and used by an employee and his tippees to
128. Id. at 8.
129. Id. at 16.
130. Id. at 13.
131. See id. at 16 ("[P]laintiff's 'misappropriation' theory would grant him a windfall
recovery simply to discourage tortious conduct by securities purchasers.").
132. 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 666 (1986).
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make trading profits.' 3 3 Because the schedules indicated the exact
times that favorable or negative stories about publicly-traded com-
panies would be published, this nonpublic information could be
used advantageously in trading those companies' securities in the
open market prior to publication.' 3 4 The Second Circuit identified
the requisite deception by taking a tortuous path: (1) the employer
had a confidentiality policy applicable to employees; (2) the em-
ployee breached his duty of confidentiality by disclosing and ex-
ploiting the confidential information to make trading profits in
securities; (3) the employee's breach of the duty of confidentiality,
without mention of any duty to disclose, constituted deception. 3 5
The court then concluded that the "in connection with" require-
ment was satisfied by reference both to the employee's securities
transactions (analogous to BI's purchases) and to the corresponding
transactions by an indeterminate group of investors with whom the
employee traded (analogous to TS's sales).' Through this nefari-
ous logic, BI's breach of fiduciary duties, despite the caveat of Santa
Fe, is elevated to a breach of the federal securities laws. In reviewing
this case, the Supreme Court has the choice of rewriting Santa Fe or
allowing Congress to rewrite the law.
V. CONCLUSION
The misappropriation theory, whether applied in the context of
A against BI, G against BI, TS against BI, or even B against BI,
works a serious distortion of rule 1Ob-5 jurisprudence. While Santa
Fe undertook to mark a bright line between state law breaches of
fiduciary duty and violations of rule lOb-5, Chiarella and its progeny
have dulled that line by constructing rule lOb-5 law on state law
theories of fiduciary duty. The Second Circuit, at least in the crimi-
nal context, has erased the line by annexation of virtually any inten-
tional tort or breach of contract somehow associated with a
securities transaction. Although the Supreme Court in Carpenter may
clarify the "in connection with" requirement of rule lOb-5, its solu-
tion is likely to provide only temporary relief from the uneasy ten-
sion between state and federal law in this area.' 3 7
133. Id. at 1026-27.
134. Id. at 1031.
135. Id. at 1031-34.
136. Id. at 1032-33.
137. For a discussion of the interdependent role of the states and the federal govern-
ment in securities regulation, see Warren, Reflections on Dual Regulation of Securities: A Case
Against Preemption, 25 B.C.L. REV. 495 (1984).
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The factual predicate considered in this commentary demands a
federal remedy, not only to protect the investment banker's clients,
but to protect the marketplace generally against the unscrupulous
use of confidential business information. It is as clear now as it was
in 1929 that state tort law is insufficient to address all the abuses in
interstate securities trading. It is equally clear that an ad hoc ap-
proach to insider trading under rule lOb-5 has resulted in confusion
and uncertainty. Regardless of the outcome in Carpenter, Congress
should define both the insider and outsider trading it intends to
prohibit and should develop a comprehensive public and private re-
medial scheme to enforce those prohibitions. The integrity of the
marketplace in securities is one of the nation's greatest assets and
should be protected against all forms of corruption.
